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KUEHNERT v. TEXSTAR CORP.
In Pari Delicto And Unclean Hands As Defenses
To Private Suit Under SEC Rule 10b-5
Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp.1
In January of 1965 Texstar Corporation was contemplating
acquisition of the Coronet Petroleum Company. The news of the
merger plans was not made public until March 1965. During the
period between January and March, William T. Rhame, president of
Texstar, approached plaintiff Albert E. Kuehnert and urged him to
join in a scheme to buy up a controlling share of Texstar's stock on
the American Stock Exchange. Rhame told Kuehnert of the merger
plans and, in addition, told him of secret Texstar oil drillings which
would bring enormous increases in the value of company stock, as
well as substantial dividends. The latter information was purportedly
known only to Rhame and not to other directors or stockholders. In
fact, it was completely false and Rhame intended to deceive Kuehnert.
1. 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969). The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York relied on Kuehnert in Wohl v. Blair & Co., CCH
Fzn. Sxc. L. Rzp. ff 92,619 (S.D.N.Y., March 26, 1970). In Wohl, stockholders who
had purchased stock alleged that they were fraudulently induced to do so by false
representations by the defendant-broker to the effect that defendants had inside in-
formation. Plaintiffs moved to strike defendants' affirmative defenses of in pari
delicto and unclean hands. The Court refused to strike the defenses, quoted from
Kuehnert, and suggested a "caveat tippee" policy: "If such customers learn that they
accept 'inside information' at their own risk, many may decide that it is better to
reject proffers of such information and to play the game according to the laws and
SEC rules enacted for their protection than to risk loss of their hard-earned capital."
Id. at 1 98,780.
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Relying on Rhame's "tips,"' 2 Kuehnert purchased stock both before
and after the March disclosures and suffered considerable losses.
Thereafter, he instituted suit against both Rhame and Texstar to re-
cover his damages.' The suit was brought in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas4 and was based on Rule
lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission.5
The district court granted both defendants summary judgment
on the ruling that, as a matter of law, Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19346 and Rule lOb-5 would not sustain an action
by a tippee; these provisions were not designed to protect such a
person. Alternatively, the court ruled that the equitable defense of
in pari deticto7 barred Kuehnert's action.
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Kuehnert ad-
mitted that he traded on inside information and therefore, as a
"tippee,"' had a duty under Rule lOb-5 to make a disclosure to his
seller. Nevertheless, he seems to have questioned whether this obli-
gation should preclude recovery for his losses, especially for the losses
resulting from post-March purchases when he only possessed untrue
information. In fact, he maintained that circulation of this untrue
information was prohibited by Rule lOb-5,9 and thus there was no
violation of a duty.
The fifth circuit affirmed the summary judgments on the basis
of both in pari delicto and unclean hands,10 holding that the applica-
tion of these defenses rested in the sound discretion of the trial court.
It found that Kuehnert was in pari delicto with Rhame prior to the
2. Tipping has been defined as "the selective disclosure of material inside (non-
public) information for trading or other personal purposes." A. BROMBURG, S4CURITMS
LAW: FRAUD - SEC RULg lOb-5 § 7.5(2) (1969) [hereinafter cited as BROMMGRG].
3. Kuehnert also sued B.I. King, a later president of Texstar; but he consented
early to summary judgment in King's favor. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 286 F. Supp.
340, 342 (S.D. Tex. 1968). The charges against Texstar were not considered in
either district or circuit court opinions.
4. 286 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
5. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969), reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
7. See text accompanying note 41 inra.
8. Under Rule lOb-5, a tippee might be obligated to reveal any inside information
to his potential seller. For discussion of tippee liability, see text accompanying notes
18-32 infra.
9. Clause (b) of Rule lOb-5 requires not only affirmative disclosure of material
information, but also prohibits circulation of false information. BROMBrG § 4.2.
10. See text accompanying notes 41-42 infra. At least one prior case has recog-
nized that unclean hands might be available in a Rule lOb-5 action. Cartier v. Dutton,
45 F.R.D. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). That decision was concerned with procedural
matters, however, and did not address itself to the underlying securities law.
Bromberg has commented that the defense of in pari delicto should be applied
where co-participants scheme to defraud a third person or where each side in a two-
party transaction has made material misrepresentations in dealing with the other.
BROMBFRG § 11.5 n.23.
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disclosures in March because both men were engaged in the same
scheme to defraud investors. As to the post-merger-disclosure pur-
chases, the court stated that the men were not in pari delicto because
of their differing intentions;" but it found that Kuehnert had unclean
hands in the later period. He violated securities law by attempting
to defraud his sellers, even though the sellers were not, in fact, injured
because of the falsity of the concealed information.' 2
In finding that recovery ought to be denied for losses caused by
purchases both before and after March, the fifth circuit analogized
to the use of unclean hands in cases under SEC proxy regulations and
to the general principles barring recovery by a guilty plaintiff in
other areas of law. In the antitrust area, the court reasoned, unclean
hands has not always been applied because different policy principles
govern; but, even there, suit by a true co-conspirator and voluntary
participant may be barred.
Judge Godbold, in his dissent, argued against any use of in pari
delicto or unclean hands as bars to lOb-5 recovery. He saw the lOb-5
private suit as a powerful weapon against securities fraud, closely
analogous to the private antitrust treble-damage action which should
not be endangered in its sweeping effect by a "fastidious regard for
the relative moral worth of the parties."'"
Both majority and dissenting opinions, in several places, went
beyond the narrow framework of the Kuehnert facts, and seemed to
consider the use of unclean hands and in pari delicto in all 10b-5
suits involving trading on inside information.' 4 Both agreed that
answers to the question before them should be determined by what
would best effectuate the securities policy of protecting the investing
public. 5 The dissenting opinion emphasized deterring the tipper-in-
sider, who begins the chain of trading on inside information; but
from his concern with stopping the tipper in the Kuehnert situation,
Judge Godbold took the unnecessary step of concluding that equitable
defenses ought never to bar a lOb-5 action.'" The majority emphasized
deterring the use by the tippee of inside information illegally obtained
from the tipper; yet the majority would leave the question of recovery
to be determined on the equities of any given case and on the evalua-
tion of the trial judge in that case as to which solution would best
serve to discourage fraud.17
11. Kuehnert intended to deceive traders on the American Stock Exchange, while
Rhame intended only to deceive Kuehnert. 412 F.2d at 704.
12. The SEC has acted against unsuccessful and potential fraud. N. Sims Organ
& Co. v. SEC, 293 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 968 (1961) ; Hughes
v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228
F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
13. 412 F.2d at 705, quoting from Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968). See Note, Applicability of Waiver, Estoppel, and
Laches Defenses to Private Suits Under the Securities Act and S.E.C. Rule 10b-5:
Deterrence and Equity in Balance, 73 YALs L.J. 1477 (1964).
14. 412 F.2d at 703, 705, 706 (majority and minority opinions).
15. The court indicates that by securities policy it means the encouragement of
disclosure, before trading, by the trader, of what he believes on a reasonable basis to
be true, "because disclosure allows the free market to probe and evaluate his informa-
tion, accepting what is true and discrediting what is false." 412 F.2d at 704.
16. See text accompanying notes 88-91 infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 92-94 infra.
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LIABILITY OF TIPPERS AND TIPPEES
UNDER RULE lOb-5
The reason for the Kuehnert court's resort to very general securi-
ties policy is that there are few, if any, other guidelines. The legisla-
tive history behind Congress' Section 10(b) and the SEC's Rule
lOb-5 is scant;1s and developments within the last decade have so
increased the use of the rule'" that there has been little chance for
legislative or scholarly consideration of any problem before its appear-
ance in an actual case.
Rule lOb-5, when it was promulgated in 1942, did not even pro-
vide for civil suit against a violator.20 The courts found that the
allowance of such a suit was necessary and implicit in the broad anti-
fraud purpose behind the legislation.2 ' Even where violators might
be reached by suits expressly authorized in the 1933 and 1934 securi-
ties acts, the courts have allowed victims of fraud to proceed under
the broader implied 10b-5 action.22
Since the SEC opinion In re Cady, Roberts & Co.23 in 1961, the
lOb-5 action has begun to be used in new situations, expanding its
effectiveness as a weapon against various forms of trading on inside
information. Cady, Roberts was a disciplinary proceeding instituted
by the SEC against Robert Gintel, a broker who sold stock of the
Curtiss-Wright Corporation for certain discretionary accounts after
learning of a proposed dividend cut. He learned of the cut by way
of a "tip" from one of his partners who was also a director of Curtiss-
Wright. In suspending Gintel from the New York Stock Exchange
for twenty days, the SEC found that Rule 10b-5 could be violated
when a person traded on inside information, whether or not he was
in the traditional officer-director-majority stockholder category. 4 Until
18. For discussion of legislative history, see BROMBZRG § 2.2; 3 L. Loss, SgcuRI-
TIzs RxGULATION (2d ed. 1961); W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION or INsimDA
TRADING 135 (1968); Comment, Fraud in Securities Transactions and Rule 10b-5 -
A Survey of Selected Current Problems, 46 N.C.L. RZv. 599 (1968); Note, Texas
Gulf Sulphur: Its Holdings and Implications, 22 VAND. L. Riy. 359 (1969); 35
BROOKLYN L. Rxv. 326 (1969).
19. BROMEMRG § 2.5(6).
20. SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). The only enumerated action against
a lOb-5 violator had to be initiated by the SEC itself. The Commission is authorized
to bring injunctive actions in district courts when it appears that someone is engaged
in or is about to engage in a violation of the securities acts or SEC rules; the Com-
mission may also transmit evidence to the Attorney General for the institution of
criminal proceedings against a violator. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964). It can take
additional action against members or officers of a national securities exchange, 15
U.S.C. § 78s (1964), or against brokers or dealers and their associates, 15 U.S.C.§ 78o(b) (5) (D), (b) (7) (1964). It can suspend or revoke the registration of a
securities association such as the National Association of Securities Dealers or sus-
pend members of such an association. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(1) (1), (2) (A) (1964).
21. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) ; Comment,
Private Rights from Federal Statutes: Toward a Rational Use of Borak, 63 Nw.
U.L. Rtv. 454 (1968) ; see J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
22. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Trussell v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964); Note, SEC Rule
10b-5 - Use of Material Inside Information in Stock Transactions - SEC Regula-
tion of Corporate Press Releases, 1969 Wis. L. RiV. 310, 319 n.50.
23. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
24. Id. at 912. The 1934 Securities Exchange Act had specific provisions aimed
against trading by these insiders, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964). As to the importance
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Cady, Roberts the cases had not applied Rule lOb-5 beyond that group.
The Commission said that its task was to identify "those persons
who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to its
internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in
its securities. ' '25
The expansion of liability to a lOb-5 suit was taken further in
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co."6 There, lower level employees (an
attorney, an engineer, and a geologist) of Texas Gulf Sulphur were
found guilty of violating Rule lOb-5 when they made stock purchases
on the basis of their knowledge of the extremely favorable results of
drilling tests, as of then undisclosed to the public. In addition, tippers,
who did not themselves trade on the basis of secret information, but
who passed the information to others who traded, were also found
violators.27  Texas Gulf Sulphur further suggested by way of dicta
that "tippees" who trade on inside information might be violating
Rule lOb-5.2 1
The District Court for the Southern District of New York, in
Ross v. Licht,29 took the next step by allowing private recovery
against three "tippees" who purchased shares of stock in the National
Hospital Supply Company. The three tippees were friends of corporate
insiders, and they knew of undisclosed plans for a public issue of stock.
It seems that the insiders were trying to avoid 10b-5 action by making
their tippees nominal purchasers (the tippees passing the stock ulti-
mately to the insiders), and in this they were unsuccessful.30
of specific congressional action against them and its relevance to questions of whether
Congress intended to extend liability for nondisclosure to lower level employee traders
and tippees, see Wiesen, Disclosure of Inside Information-Materiality and Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 28 MD. L. Rv. 189, 194-96 (1968).
25. 40 S.E.C. at 912.
26. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968); Weisen,
Disclosure of Inside Information-Materiality and Texas Gulf Sulphur, 28 MD. L.
R~v. 189 (1968).
27. For discussion, see 82 HARv. L. Rsv. 938, 942 (1969).
28. 401 F.2d at 852-53. It has been suggested that since Texas Gulf Sulphur,
corporations may be pressured to indemnify their directors, officers, employees, and
agents. Comment, Insider Indemnification and the Supremacy Clause: The Three
Faces of Fraud, 63 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 523 (1968). For a discussion of the use of insur-
ance to indemnify the corporate insider, see Comment, Indemnification of the Corporate
Insider: Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance, 54 MINN. L. REv. 667 (1970).
29. 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
30. The SEC exhibited its intention to include business associations as insiders-
tippers capable of violating Rule lOb-5 when it began proceedings against Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith for giving inside information to certain investment
companies and not to other clients. Also charged were the fourteen investment com-
pany-tippees. In re Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1967-1969
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Szc. L. ReP. ff 77,596 (1968). Comment, Texas Gulf
Sulphur: Rule 10b-5 Insider Liability Expanded?, 71 W. VA. L. Rzv. 218, 224 (1969) ;
Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: A Vigorous Assault on Insider Trading and Misleading
Press Releases, 11 ARiz. L. Rev. 290, 296 (1969). Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, has consented to settlement. In re Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
[1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RE. ff 77,629 (1968). In continuing
the proceedings against the tippees, the SEC has recommended imposition of very
harsh penalties for the tippees' part in trading on inside information. Censure, perma-
nent barring from association with brokers or dealers, and revocation of registration
as investment advisors or broker-dealers were requested by the SEC. In re Investors'
Management Co., Inc., CCH FED. Sec. L. REP. ff 77,752 (1969). SEC v. Glen Alden
Corp., CCH FED. Stc. L. REP. 1 92,280 (1968), was likewise a Commission action
against a corporate tipper.
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The district court's opinion in Kuehnert strongly echoed Ross.
The court found that Kuehnert could be characterized as a tippee;
and, as such, he stood in the same position as a corporate insider
relative to the provisions of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.8' The
circuit court, too, seemed to accept the liability of a tippee to lOb-5
suit as an established fact."
UNCLEAN HANDS IN CASES UNDER SEC
PROXY REGULATIONS
Several decisions have allowed unclean hands to defeat equitable
actions brought for violations of Section 14(a) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act,33 governing fraud in the solicitation of proxies. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals found in Gaudiosi v. Mellon 4 that
it could not entertain a Section 14(a) action brought by a plaintiff
who had sought to intimidate stockholders from voting in an election
for directors of the Pennsylvania Railroad. In Studebaker Corp. v.
Allied Products Corp.,85 the court denied Section 14(a) recovery,
stating that "[t]here is . . .a strong inference that plaintiff itself
conspired against equity and is in violation of the equitable doctrine
of unclean hands ..... "' The court exercised discretion in not allow-
ing unclean hands as a defense in Union Pacific Railroad v. Chicago
and North Western Railway. 7 In that case, both Union Pacific and
North Western sought to win support of Rock Island stockholders so
that they might take over Rock Island assets. Each claimed foul play
by the other in proxy solicitation. The court granted plaintiff's re-
quest for a preliminary injunction against the scheduled meeting of
Rock Island stockholders and ordered a new proxy solicitation. Its
concern was not so much for the plaintiff as for the Rock Island
shareholders. It said, "To apply the [unclean hands] maxim in this
case would produce the illogic of leaving the shareholders unprotected
when they have been doubly misled, stultifying the underlying purpose
of the national securities laws."3.. In Kuehnert, the fifth circuit ma-jority likewise reasoned that discretion might be invoked to allow
recovery where, in a particular case, denying recovery would substan-
tially affect innocent parties. 9
31. 286 F. Supp. at 345. But mere tippees may not be in any special relationship
with a company at all. It has been suggested that holding them liable especially
beyond the "first degree tip," may be unworkable. Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: A
Vigorous Assault on Insider Trading and Misleading Press Releases, 11 ARIz. L.
Rxv. 290, 295-97 (1969). See text accompanying notes 86-95 infra.
32. 412 F.2d at 702.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964). This section prohibits fraud in the solicitation of
proxies. It is broad like section 10(b) and enables the SEC to prescribe rules and
regulations. There is no specifically authorized private right of action.
34. 269 F.2d 873 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
35. 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
36. Id. at 192.
37. 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
38. Id. at 410.
39. See 412 F.2d at 704.
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In Pari Delicto AND UNCLEAN HANDS IN
OTHER AREAS OF THE LAW
Courts have traditionally been reluctant to aid a plaintiff who
has been engaged in the same scheme as or conduct similar to that of
which he complains." Equity courts originated the defenses of in pari
delicto and unclean hands to prevent such injustice. In pari delicto
means "[i]n equal fault; equally culpable or criminal. .. -*"" Unclean
hands implies wrongdoing on the part of the complainant which has
some proximate relation to the subject matter in controversy. 2 The
fault of the plaintiff for unclean hands need not be equal.
Law courts have also long applied similar bars to relief in the
defense of consent and in their refusal to allow recovery betweenjoint tortfeasors.4" As a result of the modern tendency to merge law
and equity, the "equity" defenses have found their way into "legal"
actions for damages. 4 Equitable defenses are usually applied on a
discretionary basis. For example, it has been said that ". . . the clean
hands maxim is not an inexorable rule, but will be relaxed where
public policy would be better served by so doing. . .. ""
Among areas of the law closely analogous to securities law, there
are frequent examples of the application of the unclean hands and
in pari delicto defenses. One of these is common law fraud. In effect,
a suit brought under Rule 10b-5 is only a specialized type of fraud
action :46 the plaintiff is alleging that he suffered some harm because
of the defendant's fraudulent manipulation of securities.
Fraud or misrepresentation actions originated in English equity
courts when law courts lacked forms to deal with such problems.47
Therefore it is natural to find that fraud actions have been subject
to those restrictions peculiar to equity. Generally one guilty of fraud
himself cannot secure redress for an injury arising out of the same
transaction.48 For example, in Goldstein v. Enoch,49 a California court
of appeals invoked the doctrine of in pari delicto to prevent a minority
stockholder from recovering part of the profit made when the ma-
40. See, e.g., New York Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles Chargers FootballClub, Inc., 291 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1961); Ford v. Caspers, 42 F. Supp. 994 (N.D.
Ill. 1941).
41. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 898 (4th ed. 1951). See 3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 940 (5th ed. 1941) ; W. WAIT, 1 ACTIONS AND DxvxNsns 153 (1877).
42. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1694 (4th ed. 1951); H. MCCLINTOCK, PRIN InPIES
or EQUITY § 26 (2d ed. 1948); 2 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDtNC. § 397 (5th
ed. 1941).
43. E.g., Union Stock Yards v. Chicago, B. & O.R.R., 196 U.S. 217 (1905) ; Ford
v. Ford, 143 Mass. 577, 578, 10 N.E. 474, 475 (1887) ; Wright v. Starr, 42 Nev. 441,
179 P. 877 (1919); Wallace v. Brende, 66 S.D. 582, 287 N.W. 328 (1939).
44. 412 F.2d at 704; 4 J. POMEROY, PRINCIPLES O1' EQUITY § 1368 (2d ed. 1948).
45. Shinsaku Nagano v. McGrath, 187 F.2d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 1951).46. Rule lOb-5 has merely eliminated some requirements for a cause of action in
common law fraud, BROMBERG § 2.7(1); Note, In Pari Delicto as a Defense for a
Violation of Rule 10b-5, 47 N.C.L. REv. 984, 987 (1969).
47. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 100, p. 701 (3d ed. 1964).
48. See, e.g., Sankin v. 5410 Connecticut Ave. Corp., 281 F. Supp. 524 (D.D.C.1968) ; Chohon v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 231 Cal. App. 2d 538, 41 Cal. Rptr. 888(Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Edwards v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 187 Kan. 656, 360 P.2d
23 (1961).
49. 57 Cal. Rptr. 19 (Ct. App. 1967).
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jority stockholder bought out his minority share and then resold all
the company's stock to a third person by use of a false financial state-
ment. The court said that by seeking recovery, the plaintiff would,
in effect, become a participant in the fraudulent sale to the third
person.5° A party to an illegal transaction cannot expect a court of
law to enforce rights arising out of that transaction."
A second area of law, in many ways comparable to securities law,
is corporate breach-of-trust law. A corporate director or officer, hav-
ing superior knowledge of corporate dealings and control of corporate
property, is held to transact business with stockholders within a
framework of fiduciary duties.52 This principle is identical to the one
behind the prohibition on insider trading: corporate insiders and
others with access to information about corporate dealings are not
expected to use their knowledge for personal benefit in the securities
market.53 State and federal courts have recognized equitable defenses,
including in pari delicto, to bar recovery by stockholders suing for
breach of corporate trust.54 In Duffy v. Omaha Merchants' Express
& Transfer Co.,55 the plaintiff complained that certain corporate
directors had accepted excessive salaries in breach of their obligations.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska refused to allow recovery since the
plaintiff had himself been a director at the time when high salaries
had been paid. At least one commentator has written that, because
of the close similarity of policies underlying corporate breach-of-trust
cases and lOb-5 suits against those who trade on superior knowledge,
similar defenses ought logically to apply.56
One possible exception to the general allowance of the unclean
hands and in pari delicto defenses is in the antitrust field.5 7 Early
decisions by lower federal courts did allow equitable defenses to bar
a privately instituted action against a violator of the Sherman Act or
the Clayton Act.5 Despite a definite congressional grant of authority
for such private actions and, even more, congressional encouragement
through the treble-damage provision,5 the courts were reluctant to
depart from the view that allowing recovery to a fellow violator was
inequitable and unjustified.
50. Id. at 23.
51. Id.
52. Bahlman, Rule lOb-5: The Case For Its Full Acceptance as Federal Corpora-
tion Law, 37 U. CIN. L. RZv. 727, 746 (1968).
53. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
54. E.g., Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Iowa 1946) ; Gottfried v. Gott-
fried, 112 N.Y.S.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Diamond v. Diamond, 107 N.Y.S.2d 508(Sup. Ct. 1951). Maryland courts have as yet specifically allowed only acquiescence
or laches as bars. The in pari delicto defense does not seem to have been raised in
the state. E.g., Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co., 130 Md. 523, 100 A. 645 (1917).
55. 127 Neb. 273, 255 N.W. 1 (1934).
56. Bahlman, Rule 10b-5: The Case For Its Full Acceptance as Federal Cor-
poration Law, 37 U. CIN. L. Rev. 727, 769 (1968).
57. It has recently been suggested that labor law may present an exception com-
parable to antitrust law. 38 Gxo. WASH. L. Riv. 337, 341 (1969).
58. E.g., Bishop v. American Preservers Co., 105 F. 845 (N.D. Ill. 1900).
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1964).
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But beginning in 1948 with Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v.
American Crystal Sugar Co.,60 and following in 1951 with Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,"1 the Supreme Court
was thought to have established a policy of refusing to allow equitable
defenses to bar the private antitrust suit. 62 In Kiefer-Stewart, a liquor
wholesaler who had conspired with other wholesalers to fix minimum
prices was suing liquor manufacturers for fixing maximum prices.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Black, refused to permit the
misconduct of the plaintiffs to cut off the liability of the defendants
for their unlawful combination.6" The Court probably reasoned that
since private litigants have been given a significant role in furthering
antitrust policy, the effectiveness of their suits should not be hindered
by equitable defenses usually arising in actions involving only the in-
terests of the immediate parties.64 The Court may also have recognized
the disenchanted co-conspirator as an ideally interested and knowl-
edgeable complainant.6 5
Some later cases have followed Kiefer-Stewart and have allowed
guilty plaintiffs to recover treble damages. In Union Leader Corp.
v. Newspapers of New England, Inc.,6" a plaintiff who had committed
antitrust violations was allowed recovery against a competitor who
had set secret discriminatory rates. The First Circuit Court of Appeals
noted, "[i]t is now clear that a plaintiff's own antitrust violations
do not bar its successful maintenance of a private antitrust action."67
In Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,6" the Supreme Court reversed the lower
court's refusal to grant antitrust damages to a gasoline retailer who
was injured by a "consignment" agreement to which he himself
was a party.
Recently, however, there has been well-reasoned questioning of
the scope of the Kiefer-Stewart line of cases.69 Did they really hold
that in pari delicto cannot bar recovery in an antitrust suit? The ques-
tioning, developed especially in Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v.
Consolidated Gas Electric Light & Power Co.70 and in Perma Life
60. 334 U.S. 219 (1948). In that case, the Supreme Court refused to apply a
bar in a sugar grower's suit against price-fixing by a refiner with whom he had
illegally contracted to sell his entire crop.
61. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
62. Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits,
78 HARv. L. Rrv. 1241, 1244 (1965).
63. 340 U.S. at 214. Kiefer-Stewart was followed almost immediately by Moore
v. Mead Service Co., 340 U.S. 944 (1951), remanding 184 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1950).
The lower court had refused to allow plaintiff to recover against bakers who had
entered into an agreement to reduce prices because plaintiff had previously agreed
with retailers to have them buy only from him. In remanding, the Supreme Court
referred the tenth circuit to Kiefer-Stewart.
64. Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits,
78 HARV. L. Rxv. 1241, 1242 (1965).
65. Id.
66. 284 F.2d 582 (lst Cir. 1960).
67. Id. at 586.
68. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
69. Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits,
78 HARV. L. Rxv. 1241, 1243 (1965).
70. 209 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953).
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Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,7 centers around a distinc-
tion between equitable defenses. Whereas unclean hands merely im-
plies that the complainant has been guilty of some relevant misconduct
himself, in pari delicto literally means that the plaintiff's fault is equal
to the defendant's." It might narrowly be held to indicate that the
plaintiff and the defendant were involved in the same illegal scheme,
for equally reprehensible reasons, and with a similarly fraudulent intent.
When one does make these distinctions, he can, as do the courts in
Pennsylvania Water and Perma Life, see that Kiefer-Stewart and its
companion cases may be explained without completely discarding the
true defense of in pari delicto. In Mandeville and Simpson, the plain-
tiffs were "little men," involved in antitrust schemes initiated by
"big business" influences. There was some quantum of economic
coercion involved in their participation.7" The reason the Supreme
Court allowed them to recover could have been recognition of a coercion
exception to in pari delicto, rather than refusal to recognize true
"equal fault" as a defense. The plaintiffs in Moore v. Mead Service
Co.74 and Kiefer-Stewart were both guilty of antitrust violations, but
neither was involved in the same monopolistic scheme of which he
complained. In Union Leader, the plaintiff's own illegal discriminatory
rate setting was in retaliation for defendant's and was done in despera-
tion to maintain a legally gained competitive position. The first cir-
cuit said,
To the extent that a party has merely sought to offset the other's
illegal acts it has not acted with a wrongful intention, nor should
its conduct result in public injury. In such a case there would be
no reason to encourage recovery by the original offender, and
every reason not to.75
After making the distinctions between defenses, the Pennsylvania
Water court recognized in pari delicto as a defense to a treble-damage
antitrust action where plaintiff and defendant were involved in the
same illegal conspiracy. It was convinced that the Supreme Court in
Kiefer-Stewart was not overruling the allowance of in pari delicto,
firmly established in pre-Kiefer cases. 76
The Supreme Court itself distinguished between defenses when
considering Perma Life.7 7 In that case the plaintiffs were retail dealers
who operated "Midas Muffler Shops" under agreements with defendant,
71. 392 U.S. 134 (1968). See Crest Auto Supplies, Inc. v. Ero Mfg. Co., 246 F.
Supp. 224 (N.D. Ill. 1965); Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 234 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ill.
1964).
72. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
73. Compare the Perma Life (note 71 supra) argument that coercion is involved
in franchise agreements with those in Simpson (note 68 supra), Rayco, and Crest(both cited at note 71 supra). All of the lower court cases had viewed franchise
agreements as consensual.
74. 340 U.S. 944 (1951). See note 63 supra.
75. 284 F.2d at 586-87.
76. 209 F.2d at 133-34. The pre-Kiefer cases had recognized equitable defenses.
See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
77. Premier Elect. Constr. Co. v. Miller-Davis Co., 292 F. Supp. 213, 218-19(N.D. Ill. 1968); Note, The Supreme Court's Rejection of In Pari Delicto as a
Defense, 3 VALPARAISO U.L. RIv. 234, passim (1969).
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Midas, Inc. They complained of certain provisions in their contracts
which restricted their right to deal in products other than defendant's.
Justice Black's majority opinion reasoned that plaintiffs could recover
antitrust damages because "their participation was not voluntary in
any meaningful sense.""" In other words, they were economically
coerced. Black failed to make a definitional distinction between in
pari delicto and broader unclean hands, but he did suggest that "truly
complete involvement and participation" might bar recovery. 79 Each
of the four justices who wrote separate opinions seemed to agree that
there was a difference between a guilty plaintiff whose suit would
nevertheless be allowed and a true co-conspirator whose suit might
be barred."0
The conclusion would seem to be that a true "equal fault" will
probably now be a good defense to suits under the Clayton Act treble-
damage provision. Even in antitrust, where Congress unquestionably
set up the private action as an instrument against monopolistic prac-
tices, the courts have not abandoned their concern with fairness.
Wherever they can find some small advantage in the plaintiff's position,
they will allow him to make his treble recovery because Congress
has decided that it needs the help of private citizens in uncovering and
acting against trade restraints. But where a plaintiff is attacking ex-
actly the conduct in which he himself is unrepentingly engaged,"' the
scales of justice, despite the strain, will not tip. 2
In Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, no specific private right of
action has been given by Congress or by the SEC, much less one
encouraged by treble damages.85 Reasons are not readily available in
the legislative history. 4 One might speculate that Congress did not
feel that securities fraud endangered as large a segment of the national
population as did monopolistic practices. Perhaps it felt that the in-jured party in a securities fraud case did not need as great an incentive
to bring suit as one harmed by an illegal restraint of trade, because
he was likely to be closer to and more aware of the identities of his
defrauders. In any case, this failure cannot be overlooked. It would
seem to justify denying recovery where courts find that both plaintiff
and defendant are guilty of misconduct. Congress did not indicate
that the guilty plaintiff's suit was needed to effectuate its securities
78. 392 U.S. at 139.
79. Id. at 140. Justice Black also wrote the opinion of the Court in Kiefer-
Stewart. This may explain his desire to discard the defense labeled in pari delicto,
while upholding the denial of relief where fault is equal.
80. 392 U.S. at 143 (separate opinion of Justice White), 147 (separate opinion
of Justice Fortas), 149 (separate opinion of Justice Marshall), 153 (separate opinion
of Justice Harlan).
81. Damages may be recoverable if a plaintiff has withdrawn from participation
in the scheme. E.g., Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Kemeny, 271 F. 810 (3d Cir. 1921).82. One reason given for allowing a plaintiff to recover in spite of an equitabledefense raised by the defendant is that the court may exercise its "discretion" in
allowing any such defense. See note 45 supra and accompanying text. If antitrust
cases now agree in allowing only true in part delicto to bar recovery, is this discretion
not going to be bound up in the determination as to whether the fault of the plaintiff
and defendant is equal? Where the court feels that recovery is not in the interests
of justice, is it not likely to make fine fault distinctions?
83. See note 20 upra.
84. See note 18 supra.
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plan. There were remedies against the defendant which could be set
in motion by the Securities and Exchange Commission,"5 and these
were originally regarded as adequate. Therefore, it is easier for a court
to concern itself with justice between the parties. It can deny recovery,
not only when plaintiff and defendant are precisely in pari delicto,
but when plaintiff presents himself with any unclean hands.
CONCLUSION
The three varying points of view presented by the Kuehnert
opinions need to be examined critically. First, the district court opinion
that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 were not designed to protect a
tippee 8 is too facile and short-sighted. Certainly recovery by a tippee
may indirectly aid the ordinary investor if it serves to deter leaks of
inside information. Suit against a tippee has only been recognized as
permissible since Texas Gulf Sulphur in 1968. Congress and the SEC,
if they have reflected at all on the possibility of tippee suits against
tippers, have not made their opinions public.
The circuit court opinions acknowledge the lack of legislative
direction and try to reason whether allowing or disallowing equitable
defenses will result in cutting off more trading on inside information
in the securities markets.87 Judge Godbold's dissent suggests that the
best way to stop misuse of confidential information is to discourage the
"insider-tipster" from making the initial disclosure.18  Insiders are a
smaller, more identifiable group; they are more likely to be advised
by counsel of the allowable limits of their conduct. On the other hand,
tippees are a larger class, difficult to trace; they are less likely to know
that action on inside information is prohibited. In fact, the tippee may
be no more than "the unsophisticated odd-lot purchaser" who buys a
few shares on "confidential" data given to him over the telephone by
his broker.8 9 The tippee who collects damages remains liable to those
85. See note 20 supra. It may be significant that despite the growth of private
action in the securities field, Congress has not indicated a shift in its position as to
the importance of this kind of suit by making it statutory or by allowing mul-
tiple damages.
86. 286 F. Supp. at 345.
87. In the remand decision of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, CCH FED. Sec. L.
RIP. ir 92,572 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the court was considering the appropriateness of
utilizing ancillary relief to the injunctions granted over the objection by the defendants
that the SEC was limited to the statutory remedies. In fashioning new remedies, see
note 93 infra, on the basis of § 27 of the 1934 Act, the court was exercising its inherent
equity power to devise remedies best able to effectuate the purposes of the 1934 Act.
Id. at 98,594. The court quoted from Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., CCH FED.
Sc. L. Rsv. 1 92,556, 98,536-37 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1970) :
In selecting a remedy the lower courts should exercise "the sound discretion
which guides the determinations of courts of equity," keeping in mind the role of
equity as "the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the
public interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims."
Therefore, the application of discretionary equitable defenses to effectuate securities
policy is a proper consideration for the court in Kuehnert.
88. The dissent sees the "flow" of inside information as the greatest threat to an
informed securities market. 412 F.2d at 706; see 1969 DUKE L.J. 832, 839-40; see
Note, In Pari Delicto as a Defense for a Violation of Rule 10b-5, 47 N.C.L. Rv.
984 (1969).
89. 412 F.2d at 706. Tippees, in fact, may come in a "bewildering variety of
forms." BROMBERG § 7.5 (6) (a). There are numerous factors which must be considered
in deciding just how "guilty" or "sophisticated" or "fraudulent" any tippee may be.
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with whom he trades, so that recovery is not a virtual windfall. These
arguments have some validity. But Judge Godbold has fallen into a
trap when he concludes from them that equitable defenses ought never
to be applied in any lOb-5 litigation.
Texas Gulf Sulphur suggested that a tipper should be liable for
damages to those who trade with his tippee. 9° The tipper, in such a
case, might seek indemnification or contribution from the tippee; and
the tippee would probably raise in pari delicto as a defense.9 ' The cir-
cuit court majority's solution would allow the court to look at what
the tipper and tippee had done, at the circumstances surrounding their
action, and at the results of that action. The court could do what
seemed most equitable between the parties and what seemed most likely
to discourage trading on inside information in similar cases. The
result of Judge Godbold's failure to recognize in pari delicto would be
to allow contribution in any such case, even where the tippee was his
"unsophisticated odd-lot purchaser."
The majority concludes that the better policy choice is to remain
flexible and leave upon persons believing themselves tippees the re-
straint arising from fear of irretrievable loss should they act upon a
tip which proves to have been untrue.12 Tippees who, when they trade,
present the same threat to their buyers or sellers as insiders themselves,
should not be granted an "enforceable warranty"9 that the secret in-
For a discussion of some of these factors, see BROMBERG § 7.5(6) (a) and Note,
Texas Gulf Sulphur: Its Holdings and Implications, 22 VAND. L. RXv. 359, 378(1969). Some tippees may be so close to their insider sources as to be virtually
indistinguishable as far as tracing and awareness of guilt are concerned.
90. 401 F.2d at 856 n.23. On remand to determine the appropriate remedies to
be given the SEC against the defendants, the district court has held that Coates and
Darke, both tippers, must pay to Texas Gulf Sulphur the profits gained from their
use of inside information. Included in these profits are profits made by the tippees
of Darke and Coates. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, CCH FZD. Sc. L. REP. ff 92,572,
98,595-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). However, the court made a distinction between the
tippees who bought on Darke's recommendation, and the tippees who purchased on
the recommendation of Darke's tippee. The profits made by these "second degree"
tippees were not included in the amount Darke had to pay, as the court felt that
limiting the damages to the profits of the "first degree" tippees was a sufficient deter-
rent to trading on inside information. Id. at 1 98,597.
The SEC did not proceed against the tippees who in turn became tippers;
they kept their profits. This may indicate that the SEC believes the best way to stop
the use of inside information is to stop it where it starts. Fleischer, Securities Trading
and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur
Proceeding, 51 VA. L. Rtv. 1271, 1283 (1965). Yet in a recent action, the SEC has
asked for extremely harsh penalties against tippees. See note 30 supra.
91. Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: A Vigorous Assault on Insider Trading and
Misleading Press Releases, 11 ARIZ. L. Rxv. 290, 297 (1969). Section 11(f) of the
1933 Securities Act gives specific contribution rights between persons involved in
making a fraudulent registration statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77K(f) (1964). But where
a § 10(b) tipper-defendant sought to join another by third-party procedure, the court
required him first to show that he was not in pari delicto. Handel-Maatschappij H.
Albert De Bary & Co. v. Faradyne Electronics Corp., 37 F.R.D. 357 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) ; see 82 HARV. L. Rzv. 938, 943 (1969).
92. The majority sees the "use" of inside information as more easily prevented
than its "flow." 412 F.2d at 705. The tippee is the party who acquires the immediate
benefit, and if he can provide recovery, it is logical to hold him before his tipper.
BROM RG § 7.5(4); 1969 DuKE L.J. 832, 840; 82 HARv. L. Rev. 938, 943 (1969).
See also BROMBERG § 7.5(3)(b).
93. In varying situations a hard and fast rule on allowing or disallowing equitable
defenses would cause injustice. The majority's choice of wording "leav[ing] . . . the
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formation they receive is true. If given such a warranty, they may be
able to sue insiders when information turns out to be false, yet escape
liability when it is true because of the difficulties in tracing tippees. 4
The definitive interpretation of Rule 10b-5 has not yet been
enunciated. The development of rational extensions and limitations on
liability is still to come. The flexibility of the prevailing Kuehnert
opinion, which allows courts to seek the best method for discouraging
securities manipulation, is laudable.
restraint arising from the fear of . . . loss" and "enforceable warranty" - contrasts
the merits of flexibility as a deterrent to the likelihood of such injustice. 412 F.2d
at 705.
94. Id.
